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Recent Cases
F m my P RpOSE DOarBINE-AGEN Y-PROBLEmS IN INTERPRErATION OF
Tm WoRDs "FAmnLY PuBPosE"-Defendant lived on a farm with his
wife and adult son, all of whom worked on the farm. The son at his
mother's direction and with defendant's express permission, hauled
tobacco to market for his mother's father in the family truck. There
was some conflict in the evidence as to whether the primary pur-
pose of the wife's trip was to haul her father's tobacco to market
or was to attend to business of her own family. Defendant's wife
invited her sister, the plaintiff, to go along. On the return trip there
was an accident due to the negligence of the son which resulted in
injuries to the plaintiff who sued defendant for damages on the theory
that the son was the agent of his father. From a verdict and judg-
ment for plaintiff, defendant appealed. Held: Affirmed. Even if de-
fendant's adult son did not come within the Family Purpose Doc-
trine, he was directed or permitted by his mother "who clearly was
within its operation ... to drive the truck on this occasion." It was
in fact "her trip" and the use of the truck was truly a "family" pur-
pose and enterprise, regardless of the primary reason for making
the trip. Wireman v. Salyer, 386 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. 1960).
The Family Purpose Doctrine was developed by the courts to
impose liability on the owner of a family automobile for the result
of the negligent driving thereof by a member of his family who was
not ordinarily financially responsible.1 The doctrine is supposedly
based on an extension of the law of agency but in reality rests on
considerations of policy.2 In order to recover under the doctrine in
Kentucky it is necessary for the plaintiff to show: (1) that the
vehicle was owned or controlled by the defendant; (2) that the
vehicle was maintained by the defendant for the use and benefit of
members of his family; (8) that the vehicle was being used at the
time of the accident by a person whom the defendant was under a
legal or moral obligation to support; and (4) that the vehicle was
1 Neither the theory of a car being a "dangerous instrumentality," Bradley
v. Schmidt, 223 Ky. 784, 4 S.W.2d 703 (1928), nor the mere relationship of
parent and child, Sale v. Atldns, 206 Ky. 224, 267 S.W. 223 (1924), had proved
sufficient to hold the owner of an automobile liable for the negligent operation
thereof by a member of his family.
2 "The Family Purpose Doctrine is a humanitarian one designed for the
protection of the public generally, and resulted from recognition of the fact that
in the vast majority of instances an infant has not sufficient property in his own
right to indemnify one who may suffer from his negligent act." Turner v. Hall's
Adm'x, 252 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1952).
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being used pursuant to a family purpose.3 The purpose of this com-
ment is to discuss the meaning of the words "family purpose," as
used by the court, in regard to the use of the family car 4 by various
members5 of the family. In analyzing the problem only the third and
fourth criteria set out above will be discussed.
The words "family purpose" have been given two completely
different meanings. In a strict sense, the words mean that the driver
is using the family car for the benefit of the family as a whole or
for the benefit of some individual member of the family. On the
other hand, under the Family Purpose Doctrine, the words are held
to mean that hd is using the car for a purpose of his own, completely
apart from any benefit or purpose of the family in a strict sense.8
Under the latter interpretation, there is no way to infer an "agency'
in the conventional use of that term; this factor distinguishes the
Family Purpose Doctrine from the rule of Respondeat Superior.7
The doctrine, from its inception, was meant to apply only where
some member of the car owner's family was using the car for his
own pleasure and purpose as it was thought that the rule of Re-
spondeat Superior was sufficient to impose liability if the car was
being used for the business or purpose of the owner.8 About half
of the states have rejected the doctrine as based on an unsound
legal theory, since action by an agent for his own benefit is legally
incompatible with service for the principal's benefit, which is the
essence of agency.9 From a purely legalistic viewpoint it would seem
that the dissenters'0 have the better argument. Most of these states
3 Taylor v. Rawls, 274 S.W.2d 50 (Ky. 1954). An additional requirement
that the car be operated with the owner's permission, either express or implied,
has been largely broken down. See First-City Bank & Trust Co. v. Doggett, 316
S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1958), comment, 48 Ky. L. J. 169 (1959).
4 Although not discussed in the opinion, there was some dispute as to
whether the truck was a family purpose vehicle, since the wife owned a car
which was kept for the general use of the family and the truck was purchased
by the defendant primarily for the purpose of transporting himself to and from
work in a coal mine. Brief for Appellant, p. 6, Wireman v. Salyer, 836 S.W.2d
349 (Ky. 1960).
5 Generally, family members are limited under the doctrine to the spouse
and Minor children of the car owner. However, for an extreme case, see Smart
v. Bissonette, 106 Conn. 447, 138 AU. 865 (1927), where it was held that de-
fendant's "housekeeper" was a member of his family for purposes of the doc-
trine.
a Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386, 144 S.W. 52 (1912).
7See Spence v. Fisher, 184 Cal. App. 209, 198 Pac. 255 (1920).
8 See Trice v. Bridgwater, 125 Tex. 75, 81 S.W.2d 63 (1935); see also Van
Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N.Y. 111, 115 N.E. 443 (1917).
9 Smith v. Callahan, 84 Del. 129, 144 AUt. 46 (1928).
10 See especially Trice v. Bridgwater 125 Tex. 75, S.W.2d 63 (1935); Arkin
v. Page, 287 Ill. App. 240, 123 N.E. 30 (1919); Watins v. Clark, 103 Kan. 629,
176 Pac. 131 (1918); Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N.Y. 111, 115 N.E. 443
(1917).
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have enacted financial responsibility statutes" which achieve the
same result as the doctrine in those instances where orthodox prin-
ciples of agency cannot be applied.' 2
Although the strict interpretation of the words "family purpose"
might seem to impose only a remote agency, an agency may be formed
for other than commercial purposes and is not of necessity formed
by express words.' 3 The real test of agency depends upon whether
the act was for the benefit of the principal and with his knowledge
and assent.14 In Lashbrook v. Patten,'5 decided long before the ad-
vent of the automobile, defendant was held liable for the negligence
of his minor son in driving the family carriage against plaintiff's car-
riage despite the fact that defendant had not directed his son to drive
the carriage. The case was decided on the theory that the son was
the servant of his father since he was performing an errand usually
done by the family slave. Although the decision was expressly based
on the rule of Respondeat Superior, it is often cited as the origin
of the Family Purpose Doctrine.16
The doctrine was expressly adopted by Kentucky in Stowe v.
Morris,'7 but was subsequently limited by Rauckhorst v. Kraut,'8
where it was held that a primary requisite of the doctrine was that
the car be used within the scope of the family purpose, and that
an adult son was not operating within such "scope" when using
the car to drive to and from work. While trying to limit the doctrine
itself, the court was really espousing the rule that an adult son is
not within the doctrine where he is using the family car for his own
purpose. As developed in subsequent cases, this limitation has be-
come known as the "adult son" rule.19
"1 E.g., N.Y. Sess. Laws 1924, ch. 534 § 282-e provides:
Every owner of a motor vehicle operated upon a public highway
shall be liable . . . for death or injuries to person or property re-
suiting from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle ...
by any person . . . operating the same with the permission, express
or implied of such owner.
See also N.Y. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 775; 11 N.Y. Consol. Laws Serv., Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 388 (Law Co-op. Pub. Co. 1960).
12 SeTrice v. Bridgwvater, 125 Tex. 75, 81 S.W.2d 63 (1935).
13 Ambrose v. Young, 100 W. Va. 452. 130 S.E. 810 (1925).
14 Doran v. Thomsen, 76 N.J.L. 754, 71 Atl. 296 (1908).
15 62 Ky. (I Duv.) 317 (1864).
i6 Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386, 144 S.W. 52 (1912). Although another
member of defendant's family was riding in the car in Stowe, she was invited
along by the son as contrasted with Lashbrook, 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 317 (1864),
where the inference is strong that the purpose of the trip was to drive his sisters
to a picnic. In the latter case an agency can be implied while in the former the
Family Purpose Doctrine is needed to impose liability.
17 147 Ky. 386, 144 S.W. 52 (1912).
18 216 Ky. 323, 287 S.W. 895 (1926).
19 The Rauckhorst case does not preclude an adult son from coming within
the doctrine where he is using the family vehicle for a family purpose in the
(Footnote continued on next page)
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The majority of cases which have applied the doctrine concern
the use of the family automobile by a family member for his own
purpose. Such cases present little difficulty, but where facts are pre-
sented which raise a question of conventional agency, should the
doctrine apply notwithstanding?20 While it might appear that if the
doctrine applies where the driver is using the vehicle for his own
purpose, surely it would apply where the vehicle is used for a family
purpose in the strict sense. But does this result necessarily follow?
Since it is widely recognized that the doctrine is based on consider-
ations of policy, would it not be better to base the decision on sound
conventional agency principles where possible?2'
In the principal case the court chose to apply the Family Purpose
Doctrine rather than apply conventional principles of agency. How-
ever, liability was traced through the wife who was riding in the
truck, rather than the customary procedure of imposing liability
through the driver of the vehicle. Of course, if the doctrine was to
be applied, this was the only alternative without abolishing the
"adult son" rule. But this rule is based on use of the car for the adult
son's own purpose. Here he was not using the car for his own pur-
pose, but for a family purpose in the strict sense.22 Thus, it would
seem that the real issue is whether the adult son was his father's
agent or servant, since according to the court's own analysis, "it
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
strict sense. However, the language used in Bradley v. Schmidt, 223 Ky. 784,
789, 4 S.W.2d 703, 706 (1928)-"where the parent is under no . . . moral or
legal duty [to support his son, lending a vehicle to him for a pleasure trip of
his own does not establish the necessary agency relationship]"-has been inter-
preted in subsequent cases to require proof that the defendant was under a legal
or moral obligation to support the driver of the vehicle. See Malcolm v. Nunn,
226 Ky. 275, 10 S.W.2d 817 (1928); Creaghead v. Hafele's Adm'r, 226 Ky. 250,
32 S.W.2d 324 (1931); Taylor v. Rawls, 274 S.W.2d 50 (Ky. 1954); Common-
wealth ex. rel. Kern v. Maryland Cas. Co., 112 F. 2d 352 (6th Cir. 1940).20 The Appellee argued for affirmance of the judgment below in the alterna-
tive: (1) that the son was the agent of his father; or (2) that the facts were suffi-
cient to bring the case within the provisions of the Family Purpose Doctrine. Brief
for Appellee, p. 66, Wireman v. Salyer, 336 S.W.2d 349 (Ky. 1960).2 Apparently Kentucky and other jurisdictions which apply the doctrine
take the position that the doctrine is applicable in aU cases where the family car
is used for a "family purpose" without distinguishing between the strict and
liberal interpretation of those words. See Turner v. Hall's Adm'x, 252 S.W.2d 30,
32 (Ky. 1952), where it was stated:
The act of a parent who has purchased and who keeps an automobile
for family use does not involve the same principle of law as does the
act of an owner in lending his machine to his servant when that
servant is not engaged in the performance of the master's business.
Where the automobile is purely a business vehicle we apply strict
rules concerning deviation by the servant from the path of his em-
ployment, but in cases where the vehicle is maintained for the use
and benefit of the family, the first determination that must be made
is whether or not at the time of the accident the car was being
devoted to that use.22 For a development of the "adult son" rule, see cases cited note 19 supra.
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was in fact 'her trip," he was performing an act which a chauffeur
would ordinarily have performed.23
It is difficult to criticize the application of the doctrine in the
principal case as it is certainly liberal enough to fit this or prac-
tically any case dealing with a family car, but the language used
by the court to justify the result is somewhat confusing. The court
stated that it did not matter whether the adult son was within the
doctrine since it was in fact the mother's trip, and that "the use of
the car was truly a 'family' purpose and enterprise, regardless of the
primary reason for going to Winchester." The words "her trip" can
only mean a trip for her sole purpose (the liberal interpretation
of the words "family purpose"), while the words "truly a family
purpose and enterprise" of necessity mean for the benefit of the
family as a whole (the strict interpretation of the words "family
purpose"). And if the word "enterprise" had been used in its con-
ventional sense, the Family Purpose Doctrine would not have been
needed to reach the desired result.24 This confused language or term-
inology is probably the result of a judicial attempt to justify the
doctrine as based on sound legal principles.
Undoubtedly the correct result was reached in the principal case.
However, it is to be hoped that the court will clarify its position on
the interpretation of the words "family purpose" at its first oppor-
tunity. If the facts presented fairly raise a question of conventional
agency the Family Purpose Doctrine should not be applied. Further-
more, if the doctrine is to continue, there seems to be no reason why
the "adult son" rule should not be abolished, since few drivers in
their early adulthood have attained financial responsibility.25
C. T. Earle
2 3 Lashbrook v. Patten, 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 317 ,(1864).
24 It is difficult to believe the term "enterprise was used as applying to the
liberal interpretation of the words "family purpose" as the facts reveal that all
members of the family lived and worked on the farm, and at least a part of the
reason for making the trip was to secure the check for their family's tobacco which
had been delivered but was not scheduled for sale until the day of the trip
in question.
2S If the doctrine is based on considerations of policy there can be no doubt
that the inijured party should be able to proceed against the car owner where the
driver of the car is not financially responsible, regardless of the age of the driver.
In this respect, jurisdictions which have enacted financial responsibility statutes
are more liberal than those which apply the doctrine, since under the statutes
liability is not limited to members of defendant's family. See e.g., New York
statute quoted note 11, .upra.
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